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PROTECTING THE PERFORMERS: SETTING A




In 1990, James Hellwig, known in the ring as the
Ultimate Warrior, became the first man ever to pin Hulk
Hogan.' But soon afterwards Hellwig found himself the
victim of a legal piledriver that put his career on hold.
Disagreements with his employer, the World Wrestling
Federation ("WWF"), prompted him to leave the organization
and try to perform for its competitor, World Championship
Wrestling ("WCW"). '  The WWF applied for a restraining
order, arguing that it owned a copyright in Hellwig's
"Ultimate Warrior" character.
3
Hellwig's case was not the first of its kind. Just two
years before, the WWF sued for copyright infringement when
two of its wrestlers tried to leave and perform for WCW.4
* J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Cornell University. The author is a law
clerk to the Honorable Cynthia Holcomb Hall, Senior Judge for the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. The author would like to thank Professor Gideon
Parchomovsky for his invaluable suggestions and encouragement with this
article.
1. See Jane Larson, Warrior Pins Wrestling Federation, ARIz. REPUBLIC,
Mar. 17, 1998, at El.
2. See Titan Sports, Inc. v. Hellwig, No. 3:98-CV-467, 1999 WL 301695, at
*4 (D. Conn. Apr. 26, 1999).
3. See id. A separate suit filed in Arizona state court dealt with breach of
contract and trademark disputes between Hellwig and the WWF. See Warrior
v. Titan Sports, Inc., No. CV-96-15377 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 1997). The court found
that Hellwig owned the distinctive trademarks of his character such as its name
and face paint. For a discussion of trademark protection for characters and its
inferiority to copyright protection, see discussion infra Part III.D.2. The
copyright dispute continued to have great relevance for Hellwig after the
Arizona trademark decision. Even though he won his trademark rights, an
unfavorable ruling on the copyright claim would allow the WWF to sue him for
infringement if he performed as the Ultimate Warrior for the WCW.
4. See Titan Sports, Inc. v. TBS, 981 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1997).
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Millions of dollars are at stake in these disputes over
character copyrightability. The WWF is worth an estimated
$1.4 billion.5  Wrestling involves hundreds of live
performances in arenas around the world, hours of original
television programming, pay-per-view events, magazines, and
a mountain of merchandizing.6 This income revolves around
a stable of stars. Wrestling hopefuls try to latch onto the
combination of personality traits, signature moves, and catch
phrases that will resonate with the public and catapult them
to stardom.
These issues are not confined to the world of wrestling.
The entertainment industry continually tries to find
characters that will excite the public. Lawsuits are fought
over the difficult line between the acceptable borrowing from
a general idea for a character and the illegal copying of a
unique expression for a character previously developed by
another artist. The cases involve some of the biggest movies
of all time, such as E. T.,' Star Wars,8 and the James Bond
series,9 as well as literary creations such as Tarzan ° and
detective Sam Spade." The law of copyright has not kept up
with the explosion in character creation. Vague legal rules
make it difficult for entertainment businesses to plan for the
future. The status of characters like the Ultimate Warrior
that are created through live performance is especially
unsettled. This article describes the current law of
character protection and offers a new paradigm for
determining copyrightability, particularly in the case of
5. See Mike Flaherty, Vince McMahon/The Rock, ENT. WKLY., Dec. 24,
1999, at 30.
6. See David E. Rovella, He Really Wrestles With Legal Issues, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 15, 1999, at B1.
7. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q.
1162 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
8. See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods., 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
9. See MGM v. American Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287 (C.D. Cal.
1995).
10. See Burroughs v. MGM, 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982).
11. See Warner Bros. Pictures v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
12. See Dean D. Niro, Protecting Characters Through Copyright Law:
Paving a New Road Upon Which Literary, Graphic, and Motion Picture
Characters Can All Travel, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 368 (1992) ("In short, the
test for copyrightability of characters in unclear."); David B. Feldman,
Comment, Finding A Home for Fictional Characters: A Proposal for Change in
Copyright Protection, 78 CAL. L. REV. 687, 704 (1990) (bemoaning the current
law's inconsistent approach to "human audio/visual characters").
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characters shaped through live performance. Human
characters are often created and presented by stand-up
comedians or stage performers before they are fixed in a
"tangible medium of expression"13 such as a television
broadcast or a film. I will refer to these types of characters as
"human performance characters." Throughout the article, I
use popular professional wrestlers as examples of typical
human performance characters whose creators have become
successful, and thus desire copyright protection.
Part II describes the two tests currently used by the
courts to determine character copyrightability: the
delineation test and the "story being told" test. Part III looks
at the philosophical justifications for protecting characters via
copyright. The Hegelian concept of personhood expressed
through property ownership is especially important to
understanding the need for character copyrightability.
Finally, Part IV advances a new test to establish when a
human performance character should be protected. Courts
should ascertain if a performer's composite of physical
attributes, story of origin, and behavior add up to a character
whose behavior is predictable yet relatively distinctive. This
predictability test is a new way to determine copyrightability
that can remedy the unsettled state of character protection.
It provides some much needed substance to the delineation
test and fits in well with the Hegelian justification for
intellectual property.
II. THE CURRENT LAW OF CHARACTER COPYRIGHTABILITY
Copyright law protects expressions of ideas, but not the
idea itself.4 Legal disputes over characters arise in the
continuum between an idea for a character that has not been
expressed at all, and an idea that has been given complete
form and shape. It is difficult to pinpoint where the dividing
line between an undeveloped idea, and a sufficiently
expressed character should be set. Setting the threshold for
character copyrightability too low would discourage artistic
creation. If all a writer needed to legally lock up her creation
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). This article does not deal with disputes over
characters before they are fixed in a tangible medium of expression. For an
argument that even non-fixed characters should be entitled to copyright
protection, see Feldman, supra note 12, at 701.
14. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1880).
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was a non-specific description of a brave adventurer or a
loving family, then other writers would find themselves
precluded from using some of the basic building blocks of
compelling storytelling. On the other hand, the standard
should not be set so high as to prevent any artist from
establishing a copyright to a character. If authors and
performers believed that anyone could steal their thoroughly
researched, painstakingly detailed characters, they might
seek another occupation. The appropriate standard lies
somewhere in between.
The courts have wrestled with this question without
coming up with a clear answer. The case law reveals a
consensus, however, that copyright law does afford at least
some protection to characters. 5 In 1924, the Second Circuit
found that a second party's reproduction of the image of a
character from a copyrighted comic strip was just as much a
violation of the copyright law as a reproduction of the entire
comic strip. 6  Six years later, Judge Learned Hand
acknowledged that it was possible for copyright protection to
be granted to literary characters. 7  The courts have
traditionally been much more likely, however, to extend
protection to pictorial characters than to characters developed
through "word portraits."8 In fact, while "courts have had
little trouble extending protection to characters in
copyrighted cartoon strips," judges have been "bedeviled" by
the question of when to protect literary characters. 9 The
judges have fashioned two tests, the delineation test and the
"story being told" test, in an attempt to set an appropriate
threshold for copyright of fictional characters.
15. According to the standard treatise on copyright, "it is clearly the
prevailing view that characters per se are entitled to copyright protection." 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12, at 2-
172.33; see also CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAw 138 (4th ed. 1998)
(crediting the case of Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989), with
finally establishing that literary characters are copyrightable). But see Miller v.
CBS, 209 U.S.P.Q. 502, 504 (C.D. Cal. 1980) ("Ideas, themes, locale or
characters in an author's copyrighted works are not protected by the law of
copyright.").
16. See King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1924)
("A reproduction in materials of the copyrighted cartoon character, it would
seem, is equally a violation of the copyright of the cartoon.").
17. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
18. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 15, § 2.12, at 2-175; see, e.g., Walt
Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978).
19. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 15, at 138.
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A. The Delineation Test
The first effort to define the moment when a character
becomes entitled to copyright protection came in the case of
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation." In Nichols, the
plaintiff claimed that the defendant's screenplay and film
called "The Cohens and The Kellys" had copied from her
copyrighted play, "Abie's Irish Rose."21  The plays were
similar. They both involved quarrels between a Jewish father
and an Irish father, the marriage of their children, the birth
of their grandchildren, and a reconciliation."2
Writing for the Nichols court, Judge Learned Hand
explained that the copyrightability of the "Abie's Irish Rose"
characters hinged on how far they had been fleshed out for
the audience: "[T]he less developed the characters, the less
they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must
bear for marking them too indistinctly."2" Hand admitted
that he had not uncovered a single case where a character
had been sufficiently delineated to be copyrightable, but the
above statement suggests that he thought such a situation
might exist. To make his point more clear, Hand gave the
following example:
If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that
a second comer might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or
Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough that for
one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept
wassail to the discomfort of the household, or a vain and
24foppish steward who became amorous of his mistress.
Hand argued that the characters in "Abie's Irish Rose"
were, like the riotous knight and the foppish steward, not
drawn distinctly enough to merit copyright protection. For
example, the children of the feuding fathers were "so faintly
indicated as to be no more than stage properties."25 All that
could be said of them is that they were "loving and fertile,"
and any author should be within his rights to put a loving
and fertile couple in his play without worrying that he had
20. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
21. See id. at 120.
22. See id. at 122.
23. Id. at 121.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 122.
20011 345
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
infringed on someone else's copyright.2"
Judges and scholars cite Nichols for the proposition that
copyrightability depends on how far a character has been
delineated, i.e., in what detail the character has been
described by its creator. 7 The problem is that the Nichols
decision offers little in the way of clear guidance for how
much delineation is required. Like detectives searching a
crime scene, the courts have combed through the Nichols
decision looking for clues to determine when a character has
been sufficiently developed to deserve copyright protection.
The case offers only one clear suggestion: stock fictional
figures are not copyrightable. According to Hand, the
plaintiff in Nichols must have been aware "of those stock
figures, the low comedy Jew and Irishman" when she wrote
the play.2" Characters that are overly familiar without
distinctive attributes are not original enough to deserve
protection. As a result, Hand found that the "Abie's Irish
Rose" characters were not copyrightable, and, hence, there
had been no infringement.
The Second Circuit applied this principle again in
Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc.29 In that
case, the owner of the copyright to the Superman comic book
sued a rival comic publisher for infringement. The rival had
published a comic featuring Wonderman, a superhero who
had many of the same attributes as the "Man of Steel." The
Wonderman publishers argued that the attributes that made
up the Superman creation were as old as the heroes of Greek
mythology and hence not copyrightable.0 The court agreed
that if Superman was just a "general type," he could not be
copyrighted.2" Without explaining why, however, the court
found that Superman was more than a stock character, and
thus, protected by copyright.2
26. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122.
27. See, e.g., Film Video Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60, 65
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Burroughs v. MGM, 519 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Burroughs v. Manns Theatres, 195 U.S.P.Q. 159, 162 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Matthew
A. Kaplan, Note, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, But Are They
Copyrightable?: Protection of Literary Characters With Respect to Secondary
Works, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 817, 821 (1999).
28. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122.
29. 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940).





Modern courts have applied the Nichols comments on
stock figures to deny protection to stereotypical characters.
As one court explained, "Basic character types are not
copyrightable."33 A voodoo priestess failed the delineation
test. 4 So did a "city boy" in a rural environment.35 One court
stressed that a character whose only significant feature was
his race would not be protectable."6
B. The "Story Being Told" Test
Perhaps out of frustration with the lack of clear
standards under the Nichols delineation test, the Ninth
Circuit proposed a competing test for character protection in
1954."7  Author Dashiell Hammett assigned the entire
copyright in the book The Maltese Falcon to Warner Brothers
to make a motion picture. Years later, Hammett signed a
deal giving CBS the right to use several of The Maltese
Falcon characters, including private detective Sam Spade, for
a radio show. Warner Brothers cried foul and sued CBS,
claiming that when it bought the rights to The Maltese
Falcon, it acquired the exclusive rights to its characters.38
The Warner Brothers court began by affirming that the
1909 Copyright Act protects characters.39 The question was
where to draw the line for when a character becomes
protected by copyright. The court held that it would only be
protected when "the character really constitutes the story
being told." ° Here Sam Spade and the rest of the characters
from The Maltese Falcon were mere "vehicles" for the telling
of the story of a mysterious jeweled bird and the adventures
of a hard-boiled detective.41 The court explained that "if the
character is only the chessman in the game of telling the
story he is not within the area of the protection afforded by
33. Jones v. CBS, 733 F. Supp. 748, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
34. See id.
35. See Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
36. See id.
37. See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
38. See id. at 946-48.
39. Note that Warner Brothers' reasoning is just as applicable to today's
cases since "[tihe status of the copyrightability of characters under the 1909 Act,
whatever it may have been, remains unchanged under the current Act." 1
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 15, § 2.12 n.8, at 2-172.34.
40. Warner Bros. Pictures, 216 F.2d at 950.
41. See id.
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the copyright." 2
This so-called "story being told" test has been criticized
for being too high of a bar to copyright protection for
characters.4 ' To avoid creating a story where the characters
are mere "chessmen," it would seem that an author would
have to write a story devoid of plot, a story where everything
revolved around exploring the personality of one character.
Since Warner Brothers, the Ninth Circuit has limited
application of the "story being told" test,44 but never officially
called for its replacement with the delineation test. Some
courts continue to apply the "story being told" test while
applying the delineation test at the same time. 5
Like the delineation test, the "story being told" test can
be criticized for its lack of specifics. How does one tell when a
character is so central to a story that she deserves to be
protected in copyright? The district courts have suggested
three ways of fleshing out the vague Warner Brothers test.
First, a character may satisfy the test if her name is
mentioned in the title of the work.46 In a case concerning the
movie character "E.T.," the court found that the character
was "central" to the story and therefore protected by
copyright.47 The court explained, "[pilaintiffs contend, and
the Court believes, that 'E.T.' is more than a mere vehicle for
telling the story and that 'E.T.' actually constitutes the story
being told. The name 'E.T.' is itself highly distinctive and is
inseparable from the identity of the character."48
42. Id.
43. See Niro, supra note 12, at 365; see also DOROTHY J. HOWELL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES AND THE PROTECTION OF FICTIONAL CHARACTERS
90 (1990) ("[The Warner Bros. decision] is frequently cited to support the
proposition that character is uncopyrightable.").
44. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978).
45. See, e.g., Olson v. NBC, 855 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988); MGM v.
American Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Anderson
v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Warner Bros., Inc. v.
Film Ventures Int'l, 403 F. Supp. 522, 525 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
46. Cf. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 15, § 2.12, at 2-177 ("Although
copying of a character's name is not in itself decisive, it is a factor to be
considered in determining whether the character as appropriated is sufficiently
distinctive to constitute an infringement."); see also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air
Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 110 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (highlighting that infringer used
same character name as used in original work), affd in part, rev'd in part, 581
F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
47. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 1162,
1166 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
48. Id. at 1165.
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Other aspects of the movie were important to the court's
decision to award copyright protection, including a story line
that revolved around the "E.T." character.'9 Nevertheless, the
court found it significant that the "E.T." character's name was
the same as the title of the movie. In another case, a court
found Rocky Balboa delineated in the movies Rocky, Rocky II,
and Rocky III, although it did not mention in its opinion that
the title character's name was also found in the title of the
movie series."
Second, a character is more likely to pass the "story being
told" test if she is in a work that focuses on character
development and has a correspondingly simple story line.
The title character "Rocky Balboa" from the Rocky films
satisfied the "story being told" test because the movies
focused on relationships instead of intricate plots.51 Another
court found that the James Bond character was protected
because his success comes from the strength of his character,
not the plots of his movies."
Finally, a character may be found strong enough to
survive the "story being told" test when several actors have
played the same character. Copyright law protects James
Bond because people go to James Bond films for the
character, not for the actor playing him. "[Blecause many
actors can play Bond is a testament to the fact that Bond is a
unique character whose specific qualities remain constant
despite the change in actors." 3 James Bond may be a special
case since he has been portrayed in nineteen movies."' Most
characters do not have the same established track record to
show their lasting importance over plot or story line.5
49. See id.
50. See Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1167. Perhaps the Sam Spade character
could have been copyrighted if Hammett had titled his work The Adventures of
Sam Spade instead of The Maltese Falcon.
51. See id.
52. See MGM v. American Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (C.D.
Cal. 1995) ("[Aludiences do not watch Tarzan, Superman, Sherlock Holmes, or
James Bond for the story, they watch these films to see their heroes at work.").
53. Id.
54. See id. The MGM opinion lists 16 James Bond films, but since 1995,
there have been three more: GOLDENEYE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1997),
TOMORROW NEVER DIES (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1998), and THE WORLD IS NOT
ENOUGH (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1999).
55. Although I could not find any cases on the subject, this rule of thumb for
the "story being told" test could have strong implications for protecting
characters in plays and musicals where a particular actor is more likely to be
3492001]
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III. JUSTIFYING COPYRIGHT IN CHARACTERS
A. The Utilitarian View
One justification for copyright law is that it maximizes
the amount of creativity in society. The utilitarian
philosopher Jeremy Bentham believed that the only
justifiable end of government was "the greatest happiness of
the greatest number."6  Taking a utilitarian approach
requires the government to ask two questions in setting an
appropriate standard for copyrighting characters. First, does
providing protection for characters maximize the good
provided to society? Second, if it does, then where should the
line for character protectability be set so as to promote the
most social good?
If no protection at all were offered to characters, then
their original creation would be discouraged. Of course, any
system that places restrictions on secondary performers who
wish to use characters from an original performer's work
limits the inventive output of secondary performers. It seems
obvious, however, that there will be little creation by any
author or performer unless the law encourages the creation of
characters in the first place. The free market cannot put an
appropriate price on character creation. Characters are
imperfect public goods, i.e., they are difficult to create, but
easy to copy. 7 Secondary artists can imitate an original
character without much trouble; the original artist will not be
rewarded adequately for her labors if anyone can steal her
character.
There are some free market incentives for artists to
create characters. Captivating characters can make the
books, television shows, and movies in which they appear
more popular. Thus, artists have an incentive to create
associated with one role. For a case discussing the dangers in copyright
protection for stage play performances, see Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca
Records, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904, 909 (S.D. Cal. 1950). Stage plays raise several
interesting copyright issues of their own. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright in
the Stage Direction of a Broadway Musical, 7 COLUM. J. ART & L. 309 (1982)(discussing copyright protection for the contributions of a director to a
Broadway musical).
56. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 14 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., The Athlone Press 1970).
57. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS
672-76 (4th ed. 1998).
350 [Vol. 41
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characters that will help sell their works. And although
characters are not copyrightable in themselves, they are
copyrightable in the context of the works in which they
appear.58
But, by itself, this is not enough of an incentive for
character creation. A character's commercial appeal extends
far past the character's role in the original work. 9 Movie
studios seek out stories with characters that they can turn
into bankable franchises. 0 Performers want to create an on-
stage persona that will appeal to fans night after night.61 An
artist's desire to achieve sales of her first work is not enough
incentive; the artist must know that her character cannot be
appropriated by someone else at the very point at which it
reaches its highest commercial appeal."
Thus, an author or performer who creates a popular
58. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 15, at 140 ("The Copyright Office... will
not register a description or drawing of a character as such, although it will, of
course, accept registrations of literary or pictorial works embodying
characters."); Cathy J. Lalor, Copyrightability of Cartoon Characters, 35 IDEA
497, 499 (1995) ("While characters enjoy copyright protection within the context
of the works in which they appear, they are not independently copyrightable.").
But cf. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 570 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(counting each protected Disney cartoon character in the movie Steamboat
Willie as a separate infringement for the purpose of assessing damages). Some
propose amending the Copyright Act to create a separate category of protection
for fictional characters. See Feldman, supra note 12, at 712. Feldman argues
that creating a separate copyright in characters would allow performers to give
their characters legal status before they are included in any "work." See id.
This would serve "the public interest in encouraging a variety of artistic
creations." Id. at 715. Such a regime, however, would ignore copyright law's
fixation requirement: "Copyright protection subsists . . .in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... " Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (emphasis added). See also White-Smith Music
Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
59. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 15, § 2.12, at 2-172.33 (discussing
the increasing prevalence of sequels in movies, novels, and television); Feldman,
supra note 12, at 687 (explaining that new forms of entertainment media allow
a successful character to be seen in many different venues).
60. See Matthew Gilbert, Sequels? Nice. Franchises? Now You're Talking.
Hollywood Relies on Golden Names like Crichton, Grisham, Carrey, Bond,
Spielberg, and Disney to Presell its Blockbusters, BOSTON GLOBE, May 25, 1997,
at N7.
61. See CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 316, 320 (1st Cir. 1967) (describing
the process by which an artist fashions a character that can attract a following).
62. Cf Warner Bros. Pictures v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954)
("Authors work for the love of their art no more than other professional people
work in other lines of work for the love of it. There is the financial motive as
well."); Kaplan, supra note 27, at 820 (describing the growing group of authors
who want to write sequels based on pre-existing ideas).
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character needs some incentive to create besides the
incomplete rewards of the market. If this premise is
accepted, then some legal protection should be afforded to
characters. To provide an incentive to create and provide
good for society, copyright law needs to be generous enough in
scope to safeguard characters in original works so their
creators can use them again in the future. The courts seem to
agree with this view and recognize that at least some
characters are protected by copyright.63
The second question is more difficult to address. Where
should the line for copyright protection be set? If we want to
encourage character creation, then we must protect original
authors and performers. But what if the original performer
suddenly decides to stop working with a particular character?
One might argue that if we want to maximize social welfare,
then if a performer refuses to continue to use her character,
this is a market failure and copyright law should allow
another performer to use the original performer's character.64
But it is not clear that such a regime would ensure the
greatest good for the greatest number. As George Priest
argues, economic theory offers little guidance for fine-tuning
the law of intellectual property.65 Priest explains that there is
no normative consensus about the welfare implications of
inventive activity. This is in contrast to other areas of social
policy where economic analysis can be helpful. Most of us can
agree that pollution and crime are bad things that the law
should curb. But we do not have the same normative
guideposts to determine how much intellectual invention
there should be in society. As a result, even though economic
analysis might tell us how an intellectual property law would
effect the author or performer, it does not tell us whether the
current law of copyright maximizes social utility or should be
recalibrated.66 While I have argued that there is a consensus
on the desirability of protecting characters in some fashion,
there is no majority view on how far this protection should
63. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 15, § 2.12, at 2-172.33.
64. See Kaplan, supra note 27, at 835.
65. See George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About
Intellectual Property: Comment on Cheung, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 21, 21 (J. Palmer
ed., 1986).
66. See id. at 22-23.
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go. 7 We need to look to another philosophical justification for
intellectual property to come up with an answer.
B. Property as Personhood
Property is not only valuable for its social utility. The
philosopher Georg Hegel defended property as a way for an
individual to manifest her will on the external world.68
According to Hegel, a person does not have a concrete
existence until she forms a relationship with something
external.69 Self-actualization occurs by acting on an object.
Property rights insure that people continue to express
themselves through objects instead of retreating from the
world because they fear that someone else will appropriate
their object for her own self-expression."
Hegel did not believe that a person should gain an
ownership right in property because of a wish or desire.
There has to be some external manifestation of the will in the
property; otherwise the property is not really reflective of the
owner. One way to manifest one's will in property is to
impose a form on the property: "When I impose a form on
something, the thing's determinant character as mine
acquires an independent externality and ceases to be
restricted to my presence here and now and to the direct
presence of my awareness and will." 1
Margaret Jane Radin builds on Hegel's property theory to
make moral distinctions in property disputes.72 She explains
that "personal property" is bound up with a person. Its loss
causes pain that cannot be relieved by replacement."
"Fungible property," on the other hand, is perfectly
replaceable with other goods of equal market value.74 The law
67. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533,
1573 (1993) ("It is far from clear that all intellectual property rights add to
society's total wealth .... ).
68. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J.
287, 333 (1988).
69. See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 40
(T.M. Knox trans., 1953).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 47.
72. See Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,
986-87 (1982).
73. See id. at 959.
74. See id. at 959-60.
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should not recognize strong rights over fungible property, she
argues, because it is only held for instrumental reasons; it
has no bearing on the possessor's personhood. Zealous
enforcement of property claims should be reserved for
personal property."5 Social consensus already deems some
property worthier of protection than other property. Radin
argues that it is this distinction between personal and
fungible property that explains why we enforce some property
claims more strongly than others."8
The personhood justification and Radin's moral scale for
property rights apply to intellectual property. The ideas of
artists and performers are not immediately apparent to
others like possession of forty acres of land or a solid gold
airplane are. But when an artist expresses ideas, her
personality is externalized to the outside world. Ownership,
even when the owner is no longer acting on the property she
created, still fulfills an expressive component. When someone
owns something she created-a song, a computer program, or
a character-the public recognizes that person as the
inventor of a particular thing.7 By continuing to hold onto a
bundle of rights in her expression, the artist continues to
make an affirmative act of personhood. 5 The author of a
great work of literature may ignore public demands for a
sequel. Nevertheless, just by being considered the author of
that great work, the author shapes her personality. Royalty
payments from continuing sales of the work show that others
75. See id. at 960.
76. See id. at 979.
77. Under Radin's scheme, these works might not enjoy the same amount of
legal protection. As discussed below, a character is a particularly personal
creation. See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. Moreover, it is much
easier for others to tie a human performance character to its creator than it is
for them to link a computer program, or even a song, to its originator. Of
course, it can also be argued that writing the code for a computer program is a
creative feat also bound up with the author's personality. See Atari Games
Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 880, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (remanding the decision
of the Register of Copyrights that the video game BREAKOUT did not contain
"sufficient original visual or musical authorship to warrant registration"). Still,
if property protections are distributed according to the recognized personhood
interests in the property, then characters would deserve greater protection than
some other intellectual works. See Radin, supra note 72, at 1008 ("[lt is
important to realize that in a larger scheme that accords special recognition to
core personhood interests in general, some personhood interests not embodied
in property will take precedence over claims to fungible property.").
78. See Hughes, supra note 68, at 343.
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recognize the author's claim on the property and recognize
the work as an external manifestation of her personality.79
The most valuable property a person can hold is her own
personality." One's personality is synonymous with the
person in one sense, but in another sense it is defined only in
its relation to society. "[A] person has a natural existence
within himself and partly of such a kind that he is related to
it as an external world," Hegel explained.8 An individual's
persona - the individual's public image - is a receptacle for
her personality.2 Some people work on creating a public
persona more than others. By endowing the individual with
property rights in her persona, the law gives the individual
economic protection for the most obvious external expression
of her personality. The right of publicity protects celebrities
from attempts by others to appropriate their personas.8
Characters can be almost as personal to their creators as
a public image might be to a celebrity. Creators often feel a
special relationship with their characters84 and infuse them
with their personality in a way they cannot with other more
tangible forms of property. As one author argues: "Creators
and owners often identify so closely with their characters,
intermingling their own personalities with those of their
creations, that they become quasi-parents." 5  Thus,
characters are particularly strong candidates for Radin's
category of "personal property" that should be protected.
More of the person is bound up in a character creation than in
other "fungible" objects. This is especially true of human
performance characters. For example, wrestlers create
characters based on their own perceived personality
attributes.88 Duane Johnson, who wrestles under the name
79. See id. at 349.
80. See HEGEL, supra note 69, at 45 ("[Plroperty is the embodiment of
personality....").
81. Id. at 40.
82. See Hughes, supra note 68, at 340.
83. See discussion infra Part III.D.3.
84. See Michael Todd Helfand, Note, When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as
Superman: The Convergence of Intellectual Property Law to Protect Fictional
Literary and Pictorial Characters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623, 627-28 (1992).
85. Id.
86. See John Leland, Our Man Goes to the Mat, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 2000, at
55 [hereinafter Leland, Our Man Goes to the Mat] (explaining that part of what
makes a successful wrestler is a "good gimmick [that] exaggerates one facet of a
wrestler's real personality"); Dan McGraw, The Long, Hard Road to Fame:
Making It, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 17, 1999, at 58 (describing
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The Rock, defines his character as "Duane Johnson with the
volume turned up to its highest level, and then some."87
"Stone Cold" Steve Austin describes his wrestling character in
much the same way, as basically a louder and brasher version
of himself.8 James Hellwig, the man who wrestled as the
Ultimate Warrior, even changed his name to Warrior out of a
personal affinity with the character he created."
When someone else appropriates a character that a
performer has created, the performer suffers more than an
economic injury. Unauthorized use hampers that person's
efforts to control the public projection of her identity, or at
least the part of her identity that is manifested in her
character. Copyright protects the individual's autonomy
interest in controlling her persona through property.9" When
the Hegelian rationale for intellectual property ownership is
accepted, establishing copyright protection for characters
created through human performance becomes all the more
important. While the utilitarian argument cannot guide
policymakers in setting an appropriate level of protection,
viewing property as personhood dictates strong protection for
characters created by artists and performers. The
personhood rationale cannot show exactly where to set the
line between unprotected ideas for characters and protected
independent wrestling training academies where would-be wrestlers are given
advice on how to pick a "wrestling personality"). When a wrestler signs a
contract with a professional wrestling corporation, the amount of control
exerted over the wrestler's selection of a ring persona varies. Some wrestlers
are assigned a basic character and left to develop their own style, while other
performers are solely responsible for their character's creative origin. See
Larson, supra note 1, at El. Compare MICK FOLEY, MANKIND! HAVE A NICE
DAY 48 (1999) (describing how Foley himself came up with the character "Dude
Love") and John Leland, STONE COLD CRAZY!, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 1998, at
60, 62 [hereinafter Leland, STONE COLD CRAZY!] (explaining how Steven
Austin created his own character by combining his own personality with an
HBO program on serial killers), with Maria Blackburn, Skye's Limit for WCW's
Nitro Girl, BALT. SUN, Dec. 20, 1999, at 1E (relating that it was the decision of
WCW writers to turn a female wrestler's character into "a heel").
87. Flaherty, supra note 5, at 30.
88. See Leland, STONE COLD CRAZY', supra note 86.
89. See Titan Sports, Inc. v. Hellwig, No. 3:98-CV-467, 1999 WL 301695, at
*1 (D. Conn. Apr. 26, 1999); see also Larson, supra note 1, at E1 (explaining that
Hellwig created the character and developed the costume and persona for the
Ultimate Warrior on his own).
90. Cf. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 836 n.11 (1979) (en
banc) (discussing the noneconomic harms that can come from violations of a
character actor's right of publicity).
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expressions of characters, but it does demonstrate the need
for character ownership once a character has been so richly
drawn that its creator forms a personal attachment to its use.
C. Personhood and the Lockean Justification for Property
Several philosophers grappled with the question of
property rights before Hegel.91 English philosopher John
Locke grounded his argument for property in labor. His
theory of property rights is worth a close look. The U.S.
Constitution's framers were familiar with Locke's writings,92
and gave expression to some of his ideas in the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution.93  The courts today
continue to cite Locke, both explicitly and implicitly, in cases
of intangible property rights."
Locke believed that the preeminent tenet of natural law
was that all persons have a duty not to harm others.9 He
also believed that each individual has a right of ownership to
her own labor. When the individual appropriates materials
in the public domain and creates something new, she has
mixed her labor with those materials:
The labor of his body and the work of his hands, we may
say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of
the state that nature has provided, and left it in, he has
mixed his labor with, and joined it to something that is his
own, and thereby makes it his property.96
If someone else later takes this new product, this person
91. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 24 n.6 (4th ed.
1998) (collecting citations).
92. See Gordon, supra note 67, at 1540.
93. See Thomas P. Peardon, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT at vii, xx (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co.
1952) (1694).
94. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-03 (1984)
(holding that trade-secret rights are "property" protected under the Takings
Clause and quoting Locke). Locke's argument that property rights should be
tied to labor is a precursor of the common law doctrine of unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment involves the general principle that one person should not be
allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, but should be
required to make restitution for property or benefits received. See ROBERT E.
Scorr & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 182-90 (1988).
95. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, pt. II, § 7, at 289
(Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (1698) ("[N]o one ought to harm another in his
Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.").
96. Id., pt. II, § 27, at 305-06.
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harms the individual and thereby violates the first tenet.97
Therefore, the individual deserves a legally enforceable
property right to protect the fruits of her labor. 8
Locke was unclear as to when someone has signaled her
appropriation of property through her labor, i.e., when she
has mixed her labor with material from the public domain
and thereby created an enforceable right.99 Some argue that
appropriative labor requires altering materials in the public
domain in a way "that makes [them] usable and thus more
valuable to humanity." °° Locke did indicate that property
ownership should only attach when it benefited, or at least
did nothing to harm, the common good: "Labour being the
unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can
have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where
there is enough and as good left in common for others."10 1
But a "common good" requirement for property
ownership still leaves a lot of room for interpretation. Wendy
Gordon interprets Locke narrowly:
Locke argues that one person's joining of her labor with
resources that God gave mankind ("appropriation") should
not give that individual a right to exclude others from the
resulting product, unless the exclusion would leave these
other people with as much opportunity to use the common
as they otherwise would have had.' °2
Such an interpretation of Locke's writing fuels
arguments for an "individualized" public benefits approach to
intellectual property.' 3 For example, Gordon argues that the
97. See Gordon, supra note 67, at 1544-45.
98. See LOCKE, supra note 95, pt. II, § 27, at 305-06 ("[E]very Man has a
Property in his own Person .... The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his
Hands, we may say, are properly his."); Gordon, supra note 67, at 1545
(summarizing Locke's argument).
99. See Gordon, supra note 67, at 1547 ("Locke himself offered no precise
definition of the kind of appropriative labor that could give rise to a property
claim .... "); Karl Olivecrona, Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the
Origin of Property, 35 J. HIST. IDEAS 211, 225 (1974) ("Locke never states with
exactitude how the act of appropriation is to be performed.").
100. Gordon, supra note 67, at 1547; LAWRENCE BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS:
PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 50 (1977).
101. LOCKE, supra note 95, pt. II, § 27, at 288 (emphasis added).
102. Gordon, supra note 67, at 1562.
103. See id. at 1570; cf Howard Abrams, The Historic Foundation of
American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29
WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1134 (1983) (arguing that copyright must serve the
common good since authors lack common law rights that would independently
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"fair use" doctrine should do more to shelter parodists from
infringement suits so long as they are serving an audience
struggling to deal with the original work."' She states, "[A]
later arrival on the cultural scene should be at liberty to use
an existing creation if prohibiting his own use would make
him worse off individually."10 5
The problem with the above interpretation is that it
strays from the personhood justification for property rights.
Locke's writings on the subject are sparse. As a result,
Locke's common good requirement can just as easily be
interpreted as a concern with public welfare in the aggregate;
the requirement is satisfied if a system of property rights for
laborers leaves the population better off as a whole than if
there were no property rights.' The labor justification for
property rights does not have to clash with the personhood
justification. A better way to interpret Locke's reasoning is to
look at what the laborer is hoping to achieve through her
work.
Appropriative labor is that which causes the laborer to
psychologically identify with her work.07 Karl Olivecrona
argues that Locke perceived the fruits of labor to be an
extension of the laborer's personality.' "By Property I must
be understood here, as in other places, to mean that Property
which Men have in their Persons as well as Goods," Locke
explained.' 9 Locke defined appropriation as using labor to
make an object a part of one's self."' Olivecrona writes that
entitle them to protection from copying).
104. See Gordon, supra note 67, at 1603. Gordon would overturn the decision
in Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), a case in
which the Ninth Circuit found that a parody that depicted Mickey Mouse and
other Disney characters as members of a promiscuous, drug using
counterculture infringed on Disney's copyright in the original work. Gordon
complains that granting Disney a copyright that prohibits other individual
artists from reusing their characters to make an opposing philosophical
statement is too much of a restriction on the common. See id.
105. Gordon, supra note 67, at 1570.
106. See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDMDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 211-20 (1962).
107. See Gordon, supra note 67, at 1547.
108. See Olivecrona, supra note 99, at 221-26.
109. LOCKE, supra note 95, pt. II, § 173, at 401.
110. See id., pt. II, § 26.
[Tihere must of necessity be a means to appropriate to [Men] some way
or other before [the fruits of nature] can be of any use, or at all
beneficial to any particular Man. The Fruit, or Venison, which
nourishes the wild Indian ... must be his, and so his, i.e., a part of him
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Locke unequivocally "express[ed] the idea that the
personality is extended to encompass physical objects."111
Moreover, appropriative labor could encompass intangibles as
well. Locke's seventeenth-century contemporaries understood
property to include abstract things like an individual's
religious faith.1 '
If this is true, it seems consistent with Locke's philosophy
to protect artists from unauthorized copying because it is
harmful to take away a part of someone's personality. When
an object has been appropriated and becomes part of the
possessor's "sphere of personality," writes Olivecrona, "it will
be an injury to the possessor to deprive him of it .... For his
own person is exclusively his own."..
Thus, Locke's theory of property ownership is consistent
with the views of Hegel and Radin. The products of labor are
an extension of the laborer's personality. Appropriation, the
point at which an individual's property right should be
recognized, requires the infusion of the possessor's
personality into an object by spending some labor on it."'
Similarly, Hegel and Radin also argue that property
ownership should be linked to personal expressions in objects.
Because characters are especially rich in personal expression,
their creators deserve protection so they will continue to act
on the outside world and not suffer harm from another party's
misappropriation of their personal expression.
D. Objections to Strong Copyright Protection for Characters
Even if the personhood justification for property
ownership is accepted and applied to characters, copyright
law is not necessarily the best way to protect characters.
Some scholars argue that the current application of copyright
law provides too much protection for characters,"' or even
[emphasis added], that another can no longer have any right to it,
before it can do him any good for the support of his Life.
Id. at 304-05.
111. Olivecrona, supra note 99, at 223.
112. See Peter Laslett, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 3, 101 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (1698); see also Gordon,
supra note 67, at 1558-59 ("[Aipplying Locke's analysis to the intangible realm
would not do violence to his thought.").
113. Olivecrona, supra note 99, at 223.
114. See id. at 224.
115. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus: Character Protection
and the Public Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 429, 431 (1994) ("I
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that characters are not deserving of copyright protection at
all."6  These scholars make four main arguments: (1)
copyright protection takes too many characters out of the
public domain and away from secondary artists; (2) the word
"character" does not appear in the Copyright Act; (3)
sufficient safeguards for original characters exist under
trademark law; and (4) specific to human characters, the
right of publicity provides adequate protection. The first
argument has been dealt with above. Given the lack of a
consensus on the appropriate amount of intellectual property
creation the government should sponsor, it is impossible to
justify this argument under the utilitarian view."7 Moreover,
the personhood justification for property rights should entitle
characters strong copyright protection because they are
closely linked to the personalities of their creators."' The
other three arguments against copyrighting characters are
addressed below.
1. The Text of the Copyright Act Does Allow for
Character Copyrights
The Copyright Act enumerates eight categories of
copyrightable subject matter."9 Though the Act does not
explicitly list characters, they should still be eligible for
copyright because the eight categories are only meant to be
"illustrative and not limitative."' ° In a 1965 report, the
Register of Copyrights recognized that some characters are
developed in enough detail to be copyrightable in
themselves. 2' There have been no changes in copyright law
would argue that copyright already gives more than enough protection to the
characters embodied in works of authorship.").
116. See, e.g., Francis M. Nevins, Jr., Copyright + Character = Catastrophe,
39 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S. 303, 303 (1992) ("[Clopyright protection for
characters as such is redundant, defies rational articulation, and encourages
dubious litigation .... ).
117. See supra Part III.A.
118. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
119. They are: (1) literary works; (2) musical works; (3) dramatic works; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings;
and (8) architectural works. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
120. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 53-57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5666-5669.
121. SuPP. REP. OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT ON THE GENERAL REVISION
OF U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965)
[hereinafter REGISTER'S REPORT].
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between the 1909 Copyright Act and the 1976 Copyright Act
that would have any impact on the protectability of
characters.122 Therefore, the Register's report is very relevant
to assessing whether copyright can protect creations like Sam
Spade and the Ultimate Warrior. The Register maintained
that the larger categories of literary and pictorial works
would encompass all such characters and could provide them
adequate protection without a special enumerated category
for characters. 22 Thus, the lack of an explicit mention of
characters in the Copyright Act should not be mistaken for
congressional intent to preclude characters from copyright
protection.
2. Trademark Law Provides Inadequate Protection for
Characters
A second argument against copyright protection for
characters is that sufficient protection already exists under
trademark law. Trademark law does offer some security to a
character's creators; its biggest advantage over copyright is
that it has the potential for permanent protection instead of
protection for a fixed period of years.2 4 There are some
limitations to trademark protection, however, which make it
an unacceptable substitute for copyright.
First, trademark only protects a character's name and,
sometimes, its physical appearance. 5 Copyright protection
extends further, encompassing not only appearance "but also
the totality of the characters' attributes and traits" including
physical abilities and personality. 2 ' Unlike trademark,
copyright provides protection against rivals who seek to
duplicate a character's unique personality, 7 which is often
the most valuable and creative part of a character, and also
122. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 15, § 2.12 n.8, at 2-172.34 ("The
status of the copyrightability of characters under the 1909 Act, whatever it may
have been, remains unchanged under the current Act.").
123. See REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 121, at 6.
124. See HOWELL, supra note 43, at 64.
125. See Detective Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273, 1277
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); HOWELL, supra note 43, at xi.
126. Warner Bros., Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Sid
& Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1169
(9th Cir. 1977) ("[It is the combination of many different elements which may
command copyright protection because of [the work's] particular subjective
quality.").
127. See 1 PAuL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 2.11.1 (2d ed. 1996).
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the attribute most intertwined with the creator's persona.
128
For example, trademark does not safeguard the traits that
make a popular pro wrestler truly distinctive. Signature
finishing moves, interviewing style, and crowd-pleasing
gestures are part of what makes a wrestling character unique
and popular.9 A wrestler who develops a unique character
that draws in fans is not sufficiently protected by a
trademark in the character's name and strictly physical
likeness.
Second, trademark protection is tied to marketplace
perceptions of a character without any acknowledgment of
the personhood justification for property ownership. A
certain level of popular recognition is necessary to earn
trademark protection. A trademark will only be enforced
while the general public sees it as indicative of a source and
not just a description of the character.'3 ° Thus, trademark
can only protect well-known characters; a character that has
had little public exposure would not be benefited by
trademark law.131
Moreover, rabid fans can take over a character and
deprive the original author of control. For example, when the
movie studio that created King Kong alleged that Nintendo
had infringed on their creation with its Donkey Kong video
game, a district court found that the King Kong character had
become too popular to be protected by trademark.132 The court
explained that there were so many competing King Kong
versions in the world that the original proprietor had lost
ownership. 3 1 Thus, only a fraction of the character
population is covered by trademark law. Trademark does not
protect those characters that have not achieved popular
128. See BEYOND THE MAT (Lions Gate Films 2000) (explaining that it was
Jake "the Snake" Roberts's personality and not his physical abilities that made
him a popular professional wrestler).
129. See Flaherty, supra note 5, at 30 (describing what made The Rock the
most popular personality in the WWF); Don Kaplan, Everything Adoring Fans
Love to Hate, N.Y. POST, Nov. 25, 1999, at 3 (describing what made "Stone Cold"
Steve Austin 'the most successful character in the history" of wrestling).
130. See HOWELL, supra note 43, at 59. But see Frederick Warne & Co. v.
Book Sales, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("The fact that a
copyrightable character or design has fallen into the public domain should not
preclude protection under the trademark laws . . .
131. See Feldman, supra note 12, at 705-07.
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recognition or that have become so popular that the public no
longer associates them with one creator.
Trademark does offer some valuable protections to
character creators. For example, an Arizona court found that
James Hellwig could have trademark rights to the distinctive
name, face paint, and likeness of the Ultimate Warrior
character. But trademark protections end at the point
where the personhood justification for property rights
indicates that there should be the strongest security for
characters. For the most part, trademark cannot protect the
personality or emotional attributes of a character. Moreover,
trademark's application is limited to well-known characters
who have already achieved public recognition. But, for many
characters, it may take years to reach a level of public
notoriety worthy of a trademark. Thus, trademark law does
not do enough to obviate the need for copyright protection for
characters.
3. The Right of Publicity Cannot Sufficiently Safeguard
Human Characters
Another potential substitute for copyright protection is
the right of publicity. This right allows an individual to
control the commercial value of her name and image by using
the legal system to stop unauthorized exploitation by
others.13' Although in recent years courts have broadened the
scope of this right, it is still loosely defined."13
The courts are more likely to find sufficient delineation
(and thus grounds for copyright) in a cartoon character than
in a human character."7 The right of publicity helps make up
for the difference between copyright protections for non-
human characters like Mickey Mouse and copyright
protections for human characters like the Ultimate Warrior.
In fact, two authors suggest that human performance
134. See Titan Sports, Inc. v. Hellwig, No. 3:98-CV-467, 1999 WL 301695, at
*4 (D. Conn. Apr. 26, 1999).
135. See Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1976) ("One
who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.").
136. See JOYCE ETAL., supra note 15, at 918.
137. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text; Niro, supra note 12, at
374; see also Walt Disney Prods. vs. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir.
1978) (stating that a comic book character is more likely to contain "unique
elements of expression" than a literary character).
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characters should receive less copyright protection than
strictly pictorial characters because human performance
characters have the right of publicity.' Since human actors
are protected by the right of publicity, they argue, the actors'
appearance and personality should not be part of the
delineation test when evaluating the copyrightability of a
human performance character.'39
Still, the right of publicity is not enough of a property
substitute for copyright protection of human characters.
First, copyright law is preferable to the right of publicity
because it offers a uniform, nationwide standard. Only half of
the states recognize the right of publicity, "' and the scope of
the right varies from state to state.1
4
'
Second, the right of publicity was originally only
conceptualized to protect a well-known person from
unauthorized commercial exploitation of her name and
appearance. Building on the tort of right to privacy, there is
an idea in the right of publicity that we should permit famous
people to be "let alone."1 42 This autonomy interest is designed
to protect real people, not their character creations.
In perhaps the broadest judicial interpretation of the
right of publicity, the Ninth Circuit found that an
unauthorized advertisement featuring a robot imitating
Wheel of Fortune letter spinner Vanna White infringed on
Ms. White's right to control her own likeness in White v.
Samsung Electronics of America." But even the White court
did not hold that the right to publicity includes the thoughts
and personality behind a human character. White was
protesting an unauthorized representation of her own person
as a robot; there was no fictional character at issue. White is
138. See Bayard F. Berman & Joel E. Boxer, Copyright Infringement of Audio
Visual Works and Characters, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 330-31 (1979); see also
Niro, supra note 12, at 389-90 ("Because of an actor's right of publicity, the more
'human' the character depicted in a movie or television work appears, the more
personality the character must possess to acquire copyright protection.").
139. See Berman & Boxer, supra note 138, at 330-31.
140. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 15, at 918.
141. See id. (explaining that the descendibility of the right of publicity varies
from 100 years after the celebrity's death in Indiana to, 40 years after death in
Florida).
142. Cf Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (describing "the right most valued by civilized men" as "the right to
be let alone.").
143. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
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a real person and does not adopt a different persona for her
game show. All of the cases the White court used to justify its
decision involved unauthorized use of a real celebrity's
identity, not the identity of a fictional character."' Copyright
extends further than the right of publicity to cover fictional
characters and their personalities, not just the personas of
celebrities. Moreover, although recent right of publicity cases
like the White case have expanded the scope of the right,
there is no guarantee that this will continue; the right of
publicity may have reached its high water mark.145
Note that even when combined with trademark
protection, the right of publicity cannot adequately safeguard
human performance characters from appropriation by others.
Take the case of a stage performer who creates a one-person
show. The performer has a unique look and dress, but is also
known for her particular brand of on-stage behavior.' 6
Trademark can only protect the character's name and
physical appearance. Moreover, if the performer just started
her show, she would not be protected since trademark only
applies to highly recognizable characters associated with a
single artist. Since the right of publicity has not been shown
to extend to the actor's fictional creations, the actor's name,
face, 147 and voice' 8 could be protected from unauthorized use,
144. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 835-37
(6th Cir. 1983) (right of publicity was implicated when portable toilet
manufacturer used the phrase "Here's Johnny" without Johnny Carson's
permission); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th
Cir. 1974) (right of publicity issue was juryable when company used photograph
of plaintiffs race car in a television commercial and made it appear that the
plaintiff was driving).
145. See White, 971 F.2d at 1402-03 (9th Cir. 1992) (Alarcon, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority for expanding California's right
of publicity beyond cases involving proof of the appropriation of a name or
likeness); see also id. at 1404 ('[Tihe majority confuses Vanna White, the
person, with the role she has assumed as the current hostess on the 'Wheel of
Fortune' television game show.").
146. One example I can think of is "Dame Edna," a female impersonator with
a sold out Broadway run. Dame Edna is known for treating her audience as
provincials and bemoaning their lack of sophistication throughout the show.
See David Usborne, Dame Edna Conquers Broadway at Last, INDEPENDENT
(London), Feb. 9, 2000, at 17.
147. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 818 (1979) (en banc)
(stating that a famous movie actor has a "right of value" in his name and face).
148. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding
that Bette Midler stated a tort cause of action against an advertiser that used a
.sound alike" in a commercial to imitate her voice).
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but it is not clear whether the right of publicity could stop
others from taking over her stage persona.
Third, even if the right to publicity could be expanded to
provide additional protection to human characters and
supplement copyright law, such an expansion may not be the
best thing for the artistic marketplace. Publicity rights
threaten to cut a much larger swath through the public
domain than copyright because they are not subject to
traditional infringement defenses like fair use6 ° or the First
Amendment. ' As Judge Kozinski argued in his White
dissent, "reducing too much to private property can be bad
medicine."5 ' He explains that it is impossible to parody a
movie, play, or television show without evoking the identities
of the real actors.' Without a fair use defense, however,
celebrities could stifle would-be parodists. As a result,
Kozinski thinks that it is a mistake to extend the right of
publicity defense to representations that evoke a celebrity's
persona without using her actual name or likeness.5
Kozinski's concerns are exaggerated to a degree. A movie
studio might welcome some parodies of its work because they
would fuel increased interest in the original. Still, allowing
the right of publicity to take over the terrain of copyright law
seems to be too broad of a solution for the problem of
character protection. Copyright offers built-in safeguards to
preserve a healthy public domain, like the fair use defense,
that the right of publicity lacks.
Thus, the objections to protecting characters through
copyright are unconvincing. The Copyright Act's failure to
explicitly mention characters does not mean that Congress
intended to exclude them. Trademark does not provide
149. See, e.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 845
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (indicating that the right of publicity applies to "name or
likeness" but not more "abstract" qualities of an actor's performance).
150. See HOWELL, supra note 43, at 161. But see Groucho Marx Prods., Inc.
v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 492-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (analogizing
"copyright law and the fair use doctrine" to determine if the right of publicity
should be limited).
151. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977)
(finding that there is no First Amendment protection for a news program's
unauthorized broadcast of a "human cannonball" act).
152. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993)
(dissenting from the order rejecting the suggestion for rehearing en banc).
153. See id. at 1518.
154. See id. at 1514.
20011
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
sufficient protection for the personality aspects of a character,
often the most important part of a human performance
character. Expanding the right of publicity to fully protect
human characters would risk removing too much material for
artistic creation from the public domain. Copyright seems to
be the best solution for protecting character creation. But if
copyright is the answer, there needs to be clearer guidelines
for character copyrightability than are currently provided.
Part III of this article offers a more specific framework for
determining when a human performance character is fully
delineated.
IV. A PROPOSED DOCTRINE FOR EVALUATING HUMAN
PERFORMANCE CHARACTERS
A. Different Mediums, Different Characters
Artists and performers create characters on canvas, the
printed page, and through audiovisual images. The medium
in which an artist chooses to depict her character has
consequences for the courts' view of where the character falls
in the continuum between unprotected idea and copyrightable
expression. A cartoon character presents the author's
expression for objective evaluation in a way that a literary
character cannot. Even the most fully sketched literary
character is less concrete than a cartoon character.' A
literary character is created and defined by its author, but
then comes to life in the mind of the reader where it may be
reshaped. 5 ' A character such as Huck Finn, for example, can
mean different things to different people.'57
In contrast, a visual character is given full shape by its
creator; there is little room for imagination on the part of the
audience. A cartoon may mean different things to different
viewers, but it looks the same to all of them. The advantage
for pictorial characters extends past physical characteristics
to emotional attributes.5 s Bugs Bunny's wisecracking style is
155. See Niro, supra note 12, at 370.
156. See Nevins, supra note 116, at 304; Niro, supra note 12, at 362.
157. See, e.g., Culture Shock (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 2, 2000)
(describing the controversy among Hannibal, Missouri's white and African-
American residents over how to portray Huck Finn in their annual celebration
of Mark Twain).
158. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978)
(explaining that "a comic book character, which has physical as well as
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stamped in the viewer's mind by the signature way he chews
on a carrot with the side of his mouth and says "What's up,
Doc?" It is not really true that pictorial characters are more
likely to fall on the copyrightable side of the idea/expression
dichotomy. A literary character may be more delineated,
more richly textured than a cartoon. But the literary
character lacks the simple objective visual indices that we can
be confident everyone will see. Creators can use these visual
indices to justify a decision that a character is "original." As a
result, the courts are more likely to grant protection to
visually depicted characters than to literary characters.'59
This is only fair; courts should only grant copyright protection
when they can make a convincing argument that a character
has been sufficiently delineated, and it is easier to make a
convincing argument based on what everyone sees than on
what only some people can visualize through reading.
Like pictorial characters, human performance characters
allow the audience to see their facial expressions and physical
attributes. They can also acquire objectively observable
behavioral traits like pictorial characters. For example,
successful professional wrestlers are known more for their
personalities than for their athletic prowess. In training
academies, would-be wrestlers are taught to pick a "gimmick"
or "ring persona" that will resonate with the audience. 6 °
Those who become superstars attribute their success to
finding a character that appeals to fans."' Visual props cue
the audience to the character's storyline. Onlookers can see
these visual props and physical actions of the wrestlers and
use them to understand their characters. A cartoon
character's personality becomes apparent to its audience in
the same way. Just as the courts are more willing to grant
protection to pictorial characters than literary characters
because they can make more compelling delineation
arguments for them, the courts should be more willing to
grant protection to human performance characters because
the same visual cues exist.
conceptual qualities, is more likely to contain some unique elements of
expression [than a literary character].") (emphasis added).
159. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 15, § 2.12, at 2-175; Kaplan, supra
note 27, at 827.
160. See Leland, Our Man Goes to the Mat, supra note 86, at 54.
161. See Flaherty, supra note 5, at 30; Leland, STONE COLD CRAZY!, supra
note 86, at 77.
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B. The Predictability Test: A Better Way to Determine
Character Copyrights
The courts should be willing to protect not only the image
of a human performance character, but the character's
conceptual qualities as well. But the character's conceptual
qualities should only be protected if they are sufficiently
distinct. Characters only become non-fungible properties
when their audience can differentiate them from other
characters. It is important for a person to feel that she is
unique and cannot be replaced by an identical human
substitute.'62 Similarly, a character only becomes valuable to
a performer when the character has been infused with
enough personality to make it unique. I propose that a
character becomes concrete enough to deserve copyright
protection when it can be placed in a new plot or situation
and it will act in a way that is predictable, but also true to its
unique style.6  Predictability is what makes for good
literature: "[C]haracters are dear to us because they are
predictable, because they entitle us to the superiority of gods
who can lovingly forsee [sic] and thus more readily forgive
what is fixed." 64 True characters have a few clearly defined
qualities that dominate all others. 66 Their personalities are
relatively stable. Their occupations follow from their
personality.66
This test also makes sense based on human experience.
In essence, the predictability test asks whether the character
has started to resemble a person.1 7 "[W]hat counts in
recognizing something as a person is a consistent character
structure. Persons are what they are in virtue of their past
and future.. ,,"" Every person must have general desires or
162. See Bernard Williams, Persons, Character and Morality, in THE
IDENTITIES OF PERSONS 197, 211 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1976).
163. Cf. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 127, § 2.7.2, at 2:97 (stating that
characters are protectible when "they react in ways that are at once distinctive
and unsurprising").
164. Amelie 0. Rorty, A Literary Postscript: Characters, Persons, Selves,
Individuals, in THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS, supra note 162, at 301, 306.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See PETER B. MURRAY, SHAKESPEARE'S IMAGINED PERSONS 1-2 (1996)
(explaining that Shakespeare constructed his characters as real people designed
to generate human emotions in the audience).
168. Radin, supra note 72, at 964.
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goals that motivate them.'69 "[Dlistinctive and structured
patterns of desire and project" are a part of every person.7 '
Characters become predictable once we understand the
desires that motivate them.
In its analysis of character predictability, the court
should look to three distinct areas: physicality, story of origin,
and behavior. Only when each of these areas suggests
something distinctive enough to make the character
predictable to the trier of fact should there be a finding of
character copyrightability. By asking these questions, a court
gets closer to what makes a character truly distinctive, and
what makes the character more human.
This emphasis on predictability is a marked
improvement over the delineation test first set out in the
Nichols case. It sets forth an objective standard for
determining the copyrightability of characters that tracks the
personhood justification for property rights. The courts
should abandon the rival "story being told" test. Admittedly,
it can be useful to look to the importance of a character to a
work when assessing copyrightability. Characters that are
not important in a work are usually sketched so thinly as to
fail the delineation test.7' But requiring a character to be the
work's central emphasis in order to be copyrightable is too
high of a standard.7 ' A work may be rich in plot, setting, and
have highly developed characters. Rich character creations
should not be penalized for being part of an interesting story
line.' Using the three factors of predictability to judge if a
character is sufficiently delineated is a better way to
determine if a character deserves copyright protection.
1. Physicality
Physicality refers to the part of the human performance
character that can be observed objectively by the viewer.
169. Cf Williams, supra note 162, at 204.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Olson v. NBC, 855 F.2d 1446, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding
that screenplay characters depicted by only three-line summaries were so basic
as to fail the "story being told" test).
172. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
173. Wrestling plots have become more complex as the WWF has hired
writers from other television programs to develop interesting stories for its
characters. See John Leland, Why America Is Hooked on Wrestling, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 7, 2000, at 46.
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Physicality would involve the character's costume and any
props usually used by the character. Physicality could also
include the physical build and facial characteristics of the
performer. Wrestlers use aspects of their physicality to cue
the audience into their character's personality. For example,
The Undertaker emerges from a cloud of smoke. 17  Kane, "a
mute scarred misfit," hides behind a scary red mask.'75 Hard
drinking antihero "Stone Cold" Steve Austin wears a T-shirt
with a fist popping through the state of Texas and a
camouflage baseball hat with a skull on it.' 76
Physical characteristics are extremely important to
delineating a character. Popular characters have a set of
signature physical actions that track their personalities.
Charlie Brown continually whiffs and lands on his back when
he tries to kick a football. One of the most important
decisions in a production of King Lear is how to physically
represent the tragic king.77 Superman has physical powers
like x-ray vision, and can leap over tall buildings.'78
Wrestling characters have signature "finishing" moves"' as
well as crowd-pleasing gestures they repeat out of the ring.
Wrestling fans recognize Goldberg by his particularly
menacing mannerisms."'
The physicality requirement has the advantage of being
the easiest component of character predictability to apply.'8'
Already courts often begin their analysis of character
copyrightability by looking at physical characteristics.'
Unlike personalities or behavioral patterns, physical
174. See Lynn Rosellini, Lords of the Ring: Pro Wrestling is Bigger and
Badder Than Ever Thanks to Vince McMahon, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May
17, 1999, at 52.
175. Id. at 57.
176. See Leland, STONE COLD CRAZY!, supra note 86.
177. See Marvin Rosenberg, Lear Enters, in CRITICAL ESSAYS ON
SHAKESPEARE'S KING LEAR 197, 197 (Jay L. Halio ed., 1996).
178. See Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433
(2d Cir. 1940).
179. See Flaherty, supra note 5, (describing The Rock's finishing move, the
People's Elbow); see also Kaplan, supra note 129, at 3 (describing Steve Austin's
popular finishing move, the "Stone Cold Stunner").
180. See Rosellini, supra note 174, at 52.
181. Cf Niro, supra note 12, at 382 (arguing that visual comparisons are the
easiest part of a copyright infringement case).
182. See, e.g., Titan Sports, Inc. v. TBS, 981 F. Supp. 65, 68 (D. Conn. 1997)




characteristics can be compared. Differences are obvious.
For human performance characters, however, a distinctive
physical presence should not be enough. A performer's
natural looks do not amount to creative expression.8 ' A
distinctive story of origin and behavioral pattern should also
be required before a character can be granted copyright
protection.
2. Story of Origin
Story of origin refers to all of the historical baggage
attached to a fully delineated character. A successful
character usually has a compelling story of origin. Historical
origins are important because they act as a roadmap for the
audience giving them clues to predict how the character will
behave in the future. The fate of literary heroes is usually
shaped by their parentage.' Hamlet is doomed by his
father's history as well as his own.' Part of what makes the
"E.T." character unique is that he comes from outer space.'86
Similarly, the story of Superman's birth shapes his actions on
Earth.8 ' The vicious supernatural villain Freddie Krueger
acts and looks the way he does because of his fatal encounter
with a vigilante group.188
Story of origin can also tie into more current issues. A
character's tasks and her capacity to meet those tasks can be
fixed by where that character came from and who she
associates with now. For example, professional wrestling
characters are involved in alliances with other wrestlers to
whom they pledge their support. A wrestler might be a hero
or a villain depending on which power bloc he is associated
with.'89 The alliances are often forged out of some natural
183. See Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fiction Characters,
1986 Wis. L. REV. 429, 471 (1986).
184. See Rorty, supra note 164, at 303.
185. See BARBARA EvERET, YOUNG HAMLET: ESSAYS ON SHAKESPEARE'S
TRAGEDIES 1 (1989).
186. See Universal City Studios v. J.A.R. Sales, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. 679, 681
(C.D. Cal. 1982).
187. See HOWELL, supra note 43, at 112.
188. See New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F.
Supp. 1517, 1518 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (referring to Freddie's character and the
Nightmare on Elm Street series as "distinctive," partially due to Freddie's grisly
story of origin).
189. Cf. Rosellini, supra note 174, at 52 (discussing the "feuds, rivalries,
grudges, and byzantine subplots" in the WWF's program "Raw is War").
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affinity based on social status or place of birth. For example,
the Mean Street Posse is a group of preppie wrestlers who
supposedly grew up in wealthy suburban Connecticut. 9 ' By
focusing on a character's origins, the court gets a better sense
of how that character will behave in the future. A character
without real origins lacks the detail necessary to survive the
delineation test.
3. Behavior
Behavior refers to the actions and reactions of the
character that are not strictly physical. Part of predicting
what a character will do is judging her emotional compass. A
sufficiently delineated character could be arrogant, kind, ill-
tempered, generous, evil, etc. If the trier of fact cannot gain
some idea of the character's behavior, then she has no basis
for predicting its future actions and should conclude that it is
insufficiently delineated. "The qualities of characters are the
predictable and reliable manifestations of their dispositions;
and it is by these dispositions that they are identified." 9'
Some courts already look to see if a creator sufficiently
delineates a character's behavior. One court found that
costumed characters from a children's Saturday morning
television show satisfied the delineation test because they
had "developed personalities and particular ways of
interacting with one another and their environment."92 Part
of what makes Tarzan a copyrightable character is that "[hie
is athletic, innocent, youthful, gentle and strong." 19' But the
courts need to make behavior a part of the equation every
time they assess the copyrightability of human performance
characters. Wrestling's real drama occurs not in the ring, but
backstage and during interviews "in weekly installments of
lust, greed and betrayal."'94 The predictability analysis forces
a court to determine if a character's behavior has created
enough of a predictable pattern for the character to emerge as
a distinct figure worthy of protection. Characters are not
transformed by the events in their lives. Instead, they react
190. See Leland, supra note 173, at 52.
191. Rorty, supra note 164, at 304.
192. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 1977).
193. Burroughs v. MGM, 519 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
194. Tom Maurstad, This is Art?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 23, 1999, at
1C.
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to these events in a way that is in keeping with their
character.195 If a character does change, it should be because
it is in that character's nature to do so under specific
circumstances. 9
C. Advantages of Using the Predictability Test
By requiring a court to find that a character's conduct
will be predictable after an analysis of physicality, story of
origin, and behavior, the proposed framework takes some of
the uncertainty out of the delineation test. Instead of
inventing its own reasons why a character might be
sufficiently delineated, a court can justify its answer by
looking to whether or not the character's behavior will be
predictable, and whether the character is fully developed
through physical props, actions, and a compelling story of
origin.
The test also refocuses the court on the reason for
insuring the copyrightability of character: the link between
the character property right and the personhood of the artist
or performer. Until a character becomes richly textured
enough to become predictable, it is interchangeable with
other characters. A completely unpredictable character is
195. See Rorty, supra note 164, at 304.
196. See id. The predictability test should not penalize characters for being
complex. I have used examples from professional wrestling because the need for
a new character copyright scheme is most apparent in the increasingly
commercial world of human performance characters. But the test applies
equally well to more traditional and highly complicated characters from
literature. For example, while the characters from Shakespeare's tragedies
change over the course of the play, Shakespeare did not describe fundamental
shifts in personality. See ARTHUR SEWELL, CHARACTER AND SOCIETY IN
SHAKESPEARE 66 (1951). Rather, these characters are predisposed to a certain
ideological makeup and are pushed and pulled by external events. It is the
combination of the internal and the external that leads to their downfall. See
id. The physicality prong of the predictability test might favor more simplistic
characters. But see CHRISTOPHER GILLIE, CHARACTER IN ENGLISH LITERATURE
156 (1965) (explaining that every great novelist uses part of the work to
describe or imply the physical properties of a character). The story of origin and
behavioral prongs are just as applicable to complex characters, however. In
fact, the more complex and detailed a character's story of origin, the more the
audience can get an appreciation for that character and be able to predict its
future acts. Cf. MARJORIE GARBER, COMING OF AGE IN SHAKESPEARE 30-51
(1997) (discussing separation and individuation from one's upbringing as a
recurring theme in Shakespeare). The predictability test does not require that
the trier of fact be able to foretell every action of a character. Instead, it asks
whether the trier knows the character well enough to have an impression of
how she would react to a new external stimulus.
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fungible and, under Radin's scheme, does not warrant strong
property protections. But when a character's audience knows
that the character will respond to events in a certain way,
then the character comes alive. It is at this point when it has
been infused with enough personality from its creator that it
becomes "personal property" worthy of protection. The
predictability test looks at some of the same components
necessary for a human being to be a person. Like a person, a
fully delineated character is motivated by goals and desires
that give its life meaning.
The test also has the advantage of pushing the courts
away from what sometimes could be an overfixation on
whether a character borrows from a stock figure or familiar
archetype. Nichols suggests that copyright law should not
protect old, archetypal characters.'97 As mentioned above, a
stock character is usually somewhat ill-defined, a quick
sketch of a general type. In this sense, a court that compares
a character to a stock figure is simply saying that the
character was so thinly sketched that it is insufficiently
delineated. There is nothing wrong with this sort of analysis.
But a stock figure is not necessarily always thinly
sketched. And just because a character is not completely
original when compared to the stock figure, this does not
mean that the character should be excluded from copyright
protection. Some would argue that all literary characters
grow out of the stock figures of their particular genre."'
Although professional wrestling features some idiosyncratic
personalities, most of the characters are built on familiar
stereotypes.' Wrestling employs familiar dramatic themes
from history, religion, and folklore. 00
If the Ultimate Warrior represents a stock character,
then Nichols suggests that he is not copyrightable. The act of
taking a stock figure and placing her in a new medium,
197. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
19& See NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM 171-72 (1957).
199. See Bidisha Banjeree, Raw is War!, J. AM. CONTEMP. CULTURE, Jan.
2000, at 18, 19 ("Cults of personality based around the perpetuation and
glorification of stereotypes prevail [in professional wrestling]. Although some
idiosyncratic persona... achieve popularity, as well as respect, more common
are populist figures like Stone Cold Steve Austin, the beer-swilling, deer-killing
avatar of tough working-class masculinity."); Rosellini, supra note 174, at 52
(arguing that professional wrestling owes its success to its "ability to tap those
troves of human archetypes").
200. See Maurstad, supra note 194, at 1C.
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however, can be original and transformative in itself.2"' Use
of familiar themes should not prevent human performance
characters from receiving copyright protection. Artists
cannot assert exclusionary control over themes from the
public domain; as Locke argued, all persons have a right to
use "The Earth . . . [and] all the Fruits it naturally
produces."0 2 But the selection and combination of these
themes into a unique, predictable character can, and should,
be protected.
Finally, the three-factor predictability analysis would be
easier for judges and jurors to apply than a rigid prescription
against stock characters. Surely experts in the arts and
literature are better equipped to determine which characters
are following the path of tried and true literary tropes and
which are breaking new ground. But, as Judge Hand argued
in Nichols, a court should not be drawn into a battle of the
experts on this subject. "The more the court is led into the
intricacies of dramatic craftsmanship, the less likely it is to
stand upon the firmer, if more naive, ground of its considered
impressions upon its own perusal," he explained.0 3 It appears
that Hand was asking the trier of fact to rely on her innate
sense of what is original and what is not. Hand himself relies
on his own experience with "the low comedy Jew and
Irishman." But relying on a person's innate sense of what is a
stock character would invite different verdicts based on
different levels of experience among judges and jurors.
Instead, the trier of fact should look to whether the
character's physicality, story of origin, and behavior are
developed enough to make the character predictable.
V. CONCLUSION
The rights to human performance characters can be
extremely valuable. The craze over professional wrestling
shows just how important they can be. Yet the current law of
copyright is very unsettled and vague, thus making it difficult
to know when a character has been sufficiently developed so
as to be copyrightable. Copyright law should protect
characters. Intellectual property rights are justified because
they personally affirm the rights of the creative artist in
201. See Rorty, supra note 164, at 305-06.
202. LOCKE, supra note 95, pt. II, § 26, at 304.
203. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930).
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society, and human performance characters are closer to the
person of the artist than any other type of intellectual
property. Copyright protection is needed because trademark
and the right of publicity are insufficient to fully safeguard
these types of characters.
A clearer route for determining when a character has
been sufficiently delineated to deserve protection focuses on
whether that character's actions will be predictable in the
future. When the trier of fact can predict how a character
will respond to a new situation, the character is ripe for
copyright protection. To determine this, the trier of fact
should look at the character's physicality, its story line, and
its physical and emotional behavior. Only when the trier can
thoroughly describe the character according to each of these
variables does the character become predictable enough to be
sufficiently delineated for copyright protection. This new
framework for character copyrightability gives needed
substance to the ad hoc determinations of character
development currently used by the courts. Moreover, it
focuses on the personal characteristics that are important in
a legal regime that is justified by awarding rights for the self-
actualization of character creators. The framework also
steers the courts away from per se rules against
copyrightability when a character resembles a stock figure or
familiar archetype. Judges will always have a difficult time
pinning down the exact line between a protectable character
and an unfinished idea. °4 Still, artists and the public will
benefit from copyright guidelines that not only make that line
easier to see, but also move the law into closer alignment
with the philosophical justifications for intellectual property.
204. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating
that the "idea-expression distinction has proved especially elusive" for cases
involving characters).
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